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1. Introduction
1.
In my following remarks I will focus on a differente which we find in
German law as well as in other legislations, the differente between
entrepreneurial investments among firms and merely financial investments.
Whereas OUT law of groups of companies of “Konzernrecht” contains quite
an elaborated set of rules, the rules governing financial investments,
especially Cross-border  financial investments, seems to be somewhat
underdeveloped.
2.
Let me Start with some general r,emarks about entrepreneurial and merely
financial investments. This differentiation does not refer to the object of
the investment (real assets, incorporeal assets, financial assets) but on its
purpose. To be Sure, if a car Producer  acquires a controlling block of shares
in a tyre producing Company the purpose of this investment is also a
“financial” one in the end: This investment aims, like “merely financial”
investments do, at generating the highest possible outcome  for the investing
firm. However, crucial differentes  between entrepreneurial and “merely
financial” investments remain. In our example the investor is interested in
the first line in the product of the firm in which he has invested; it is a
necessary part for his own production.  The respective firm invests into a
supplier of goods which he needs for his own activity; he invests
“backwards”. An example for a “forward investment” would be the
acquisition of a Stake in a foreign marketing Company. In other cases of2
entrepreneurial investment the investor may be interested in getting or
securing his access to raw materials, overcoming market entry barriers in a
foreign environment, gaining from joint production  (economies
economies of scope), from the skills of the acquired firm’s
workforce, and the like.
of  scale or
weil-trained
In contrast to cases of “entrepreneurial” investment we observe also
“merely financial” investments not only by private investors or financial
institutions but also by firms or entrepreneurs. In such a case the investor is
not interested in the products,  assets, skills or other advantages which
might flow from his investment to his own (other) firm or firms. He does not
intend to support or bolster another entrepreneurial activity by his
investment but is simply interested in getting the highest possible return in
terms of dividends, interests or gains in the prize of the shares held by him.
This distinction  leads us to a first Observation concerning the investment and
control Patterns  of these two different kinds of investments. Investment as
well as control Patterns differ in cases of entrepreneurial and merely
financial investments.
II. Investment and control Patterns
1.
The entreoreneurial investor will typically tend to shape the contract or to
acquire a participation  such that he will resch his goal (make the firm in
which he has invested to supply him with the goods, Services or knowledge
for which he was looking; abstain from competition  and so on). If the
entrepreneurial investment consists in the acquisition of an equity Stake in a
Company’ this will typically mean that the investor either acquires a
controlling block of shares or, at least, an influential (blocking) minority
Position  as a smaller Portion does not give him the means to pursue his
goals. As the entrepreneurial investor will try to resch these goals, he will
normally tend to control the firm in which he has invested, and exercize his
rights as a shareholder actively.3
2.
Patterns of investment and control look different in merelv financial
investments. Whether the “financial investor” will buy an equity Stake in a
firm as well as the size of such a participation will depend on the expected
return and the assumed riskiness of the investment (the own preferences of
the investor - risk aversion or risk neutrality - and portfolio deliberations like
diversification  etc.)*. That may mean and actually very often means that the
Stake which the financial investor acquires is too small to control the firm in
which he has invested, and to exercize his rights as a shareholder actively. I
will get back to this Problem later.
Ill. The law governing entrepreneurial and financial equity investments in
firms
Entrepreneurial and financial equity
questions, and to different solutions.
investments in firms lead to different
1.
The entrepreneurial investor may, for instance, have incentive  to exploit
business opportunities of one firm for the benefit of another in which he
holds a larger Stake. Or he may ask management of one firm for deals with
his other firm(s) that are not at arm’s length, and there may be more
opportunities for such detrimental deals or better possibilities to hide them
for an entrepreneurial than for a merely financial investor. German corporate
law therefore contains quite a detailled and thorough body of rules that are
exclusively applicable on entrepreneurial investments or “groups of
companies” (“Konzernrecht”)3. To be Sure, the Point of reference of these
rules is not the entrepreneurial purpose of the investment or the subjective
intent of the investor. These rules are applicable if one enterprise is able - by
virtue of its participation or otherwise - to exercise a controlling influence on
another enterprise, whether or not the specific dangers for outside
shareholders and creditors  of the controlled  (or the controlling firms) are
likely to materialize. These rules are also applicable on foreign4
entrepreneurial investments in German companies, and some of these rules
apply on German investments abroad, too4 .
2.
Merely financial, non-entrepreneurial Investments are, however, subject to
the general rules of Company law, be these domestic  or foreign investments
in a German Company. lt seems, however, that this part of our Company law
is somewhat unprepared vis-a-vis the growing importante  of foreign
financial investments in German Stocks, and it is to this development and
some consequences for future reform that I turn to in the following.
IV. Foreign institutional investments in German stock corporations
1.
With the growth of foreign institutional investors, especially Pension and
investment funds, and the internationalization of the securities markets,
European  as well as institutional investors from overseas have acquired
substantial blocks of stock of the major German
following I try first to describe this development a bit
Point at some Problems which these investors face
questions.
corporations. In the
more in detail. Then I
and put some policy
In 1992 there were (of more than 2 million firms in Germany) about 3,000
5. stock corporations , of these only 665 are quoted on a stock exchange 6 ,
and of these 665 about 80 are widely held and traded7.  However, most of
these corporations with widely distributed ownership are among the 100
largest firms in Germany8, and foreign institutionals have picked their “blue
Chips” like Siemens, Deutsche Bank or Daimler-Benz from this group.
The ever increasing importante  and rapid development of foreign
institutional investment in German stock corporations has been described
and analyzed with respect to its various policy implications  several times5
recently9. Let us just have a look at one - presumably typical’O - example,
the development in Siemens Aktiengesellschaft.
In 1973, of a share capital of DM 1,3 bn, about 29 % of all shares were
held by foreigners including institutional investors like insurance companies,
investment and Pension funds, and banks; the (about 1,000) foreign
institutionals alone held about 4,5 % of all shares. In 1986, foreigners
already held more than 43 % of all shares (of a share capital of
DM 2,4 bn)’ ’ . This latter number was corroborated by a sociological study
with numbers as of Ott. Ist, 1990’ 2. According to this study institutionals
held at least 35 % of all shares of Siemens in 1990; among them foreign
institutional investors with about 18 % of Siemens stock capital. All foreign
investments in German shares ran up to DM 5,7 bn in 1980 whereas the
total amount in 1991 was approximately DM 15,6 bn’ 3.
At the same time, the presence of shareholders at the shareholders meetings
fell significantly: In 1975, 72,l % of all shares of Siemens were represented
whereas this number fell to 50,30 % in 1992. The numbers for other firms
show a similar or an even more dramatical decrease: BASF 1975:
65,9 %/1992:  52,28 %; Bayer 1975: 64,9 %/1992:  49,67 %; Thyssen
1975: 84,0 %/1992:  68,4 %; Deutsche Bank 1975: 63,3 %/1992:
45 8 %14. I
2.
Apparently the increasing passivity of shareholders is correlated with
increase of foreign investments. What are the reasons for this Pattern,
what are the drawbacks  of this development?
the
and
At first sight not the recent low presence at shareholders meetings of our
publicly held corporations but the former high presence needs to be
explained. For this seems to contradict the common Observation of collective
action Problems  in corporations with dispersed shareholders. lt is not
rational for a Single shareholder holding a small fraction of a company’s
stock to engage in disciplining management (collect information, taking part
in general meetings, vote, or even sue management for misbehavior) if the6
gross benefits of his or her activity are lower than its costs. To put it more
correctly: if the costs of these activities are such that the gains from
alternative courses of action (holding shares but not attempting to discipline
management, selling shares and investing in some other investment) are
greater than the gains to the shareholder from disciplining management15.
So how tan the formerly high numbers of presence at the shareholders
meetings of German publicly held corporations be explained? The
explanation lies in the German depositary voting System. Shares are usually
deposited with banks, and these banks are given a proxy to vote the
deposited shares at shareholders meetings16.  These proxies which are given
to a few depot institutions lead to scale economies in monitoring.
Why then do foreign investors not as weil give proxies to depot institutions,
at least not to the extent to which German investors do so? lt would be
interesting to interview the managers of these institutions or funds and ask
them for their motives. Here are some presumed answers:
lt is a general policy of our fund or house to remain passive, not to
spend money on monitoring ourselves managements of the
companies in which we have invested, but to rely on “free-riding” on
the efforts of other investors instead. If we don’t like the shares of a
Company anymore we follow the “Wall Street rule” and choose the
“exit” rather than the “voice” Option 17 .
The interests of the depot institutions and shareholders may diverge
substantially; hence these institutions have to be supervised
themselves. This “control of controllers”  creates higher information
and monitoring costs for a foreign than for a domestic  investor.
If an investor does not hold an account with a German credit
institution or a foreign institution which is subject  to the respective
rules for German credit institutions he even cannot  be sure to receive
the invitations, information or other notices from his Company. The
institution with which he has deposited his shares might not be
obliged to transmit to the beneficial owners the material which it
receives from the company18, and it might not be obliged to vote its
client’s shares at shareholders meetings at their demand according7
to the rules with which a domestic  credit institution has to
comply’ g.
Voting at least large blocks of shares of a Company  oneself is no
alternative: Statutes of German companies mostly require that the
shareholder deposit his or her shares for a certain period of time
before and during the general meeting with a credit institution2’.
This creates new costs and may harnper the sale of the shares
during this period. In Single cases the certificate of a foreign
institution that shares have been deposited with them might not
suffice and not be accepted as a legitimation.
Direct cooperation  of several institutional investors like, e. g., by
concluding agreements about the repeal of antitakeover provisions,
the question whether or not to tender the shares to a bidder, to
agree to structural changes of the Company etc., is not only costly
but almost impossible because holdings of stock have, according to
German Company law, only to be disclosed if such a holding
comprises more than 25 % of all shares of a stock corporation, and
if this participation  is held by another enterprise 21. That means that
information about who the other shareholders are tan only be
obtained if these hold large blocks. The Company itself does not
have this information, either, as shares are mostly non-registered
bearer shares. The only way to get into contact with the other
shareholders is via the depot banks which tan pass on
communications to their clients but are only obliged to do so in
limited cases22.
3.
Before we think about improvements and policy recommendations we should
first recall shortly the arguments why improvements seem necessary, why
shareholders passivity is detrimental to the individual shareholders
themselves as weil as for the Company.
In principle, lack of control of management means agency costs for the
shareholders; these agency costs might then be - but are not necessarily -8
lowered by other control devices like, e. g., pressure on management from
competition  on the product markets with the ensuing threat of bankruptcy
and loss of management’s positions. Choosing “exit” in contrast to the
“voice” Option is not a perfett Solution  for a shareholder as selling means
suffering the low price that attaches to the shares of a poorly performing
firm. Apart from that, the holdings of institutional investors may be so large
that sales may be taken as a negative Signal by the market and hence have
too great an impact on the stock price of the portfolio as to serve as a
disciplining instrument23. Free-riding on the efforts of other shareholders
will only help if these others do not choose to take the same approach but
have incentive  themselves to monitor. That is very likely not the case in a
publicly held corporation with widely dispersed small shareholdings. The
foreign institutional investors could, of course, try to rely on that their
interests will be safeguarded by the domestic depot banks. However, these
agents may pursue own interests. To exclude conflicts of interests in
exercizing the depositary votes at their discretion  these institutions should
be given instructions how to vote. And their efforts should be monitored by
competitive pressure from other competing institutions or alternative
proposals of independent groups of shareholders in the shareholders
meetings.
V. Policy consequences
Which Steps should be taken?
1.
Communication among shareholders should be made easier in Order to
overcome the collective action Problem (high information and monitoring
costs for small shareholders), to create an alternative to the use of the
depositary voting System and thus reduce the scope of discretion  of the
depositary institutions.
The current draft of a federal law which is to transform and
implement the rules of the “transparency directive”  of the EC249
(Entwurf “Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz” as of June 29,
1993) provides that a shareholder whose holding surmounts five
percent (or certain higher thresholds)  has to give the Company due
notice thereof. That means in the case of, e. g., Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft with a stock capital of DM 2,638 bn that a
shareholder has to hold shares with a nominal value of more than
DM 131,9 million before he has to give notice of his holding to the
Company and before the other shareholders tan get into contact with
him. This threshold seems too high and should be lowered.
As an additional means to promote communication among
shareholders the law should provide that names and addresses of
non-objecting shareholders be furnished from the depositary
institutions to the issuing Company and from it to any shareholder on
his or her demand who then may communicate directly with such
shareholders.
Furthermore, the companies should be obliged to pass to any
shareholder on his or her demand a list of all persons and institutions
that have exercized votes at the previous shareholders meeting in its
own name or in the name of “whom the vote concerns”.
Lastly, legislation should ensure that managements of companies
accept also certificates of foreign credit institutions or investment
firms (at least of the EC member states and such states where the
firm’s stock is listed and traded on a stock exchange) that shares
have been deposited with them as a legitimation for shareholders to
be admitted to shareholders meetings.
2.
There are quite some more Points to be thought of if we want to lure and
obtain foreign capital investments in our large firms. Some reforms are under
way, like the insider and the transparency legislation, others will have to be
discussed further, like the repeal of restrictions  of voting rights, a convincing
framework of rules governing hostile takeovers, the improvement of the10
internal governance structure of our large corporations and others.
Transnational investments and cooperation  tan still be improved.11
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